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~ Summmer List 15, Sheet 6 
No. 77-1511 
CALIFANO, Sec'y of HEW 
v. 
ELLIOTT 
Motjon for Resps for Leave 
to -proceed IFP 
The cert petn appears at page 14 (Summer List 5, Sheet 1). 
Resps seek to proceed ifp in this case involving the legality 
of the pre-hearing reduction or suspension of social security benefits 
to recoup allegedly erroneous overpayments. 
Resps are represented by two legal aid societies; they were 
granted ifp status in CA 9 and when they were before the Court in 
1975 (425 US 987). Attached to the motion are the affidavits of 
three of the named representatives of the class, who state that 
they cannot afford to pay costs of this litigation. 
It would appear that this motion should be granted. 
Richman 
~ ;?of d) A~..,. c3 l ~ 
-' 
PRELIMINARY ME.l\10 
Summer List 5, Sheet 1 
No. 77-1511 Cert to CA9 
(Browning, Trask, Williams [DJ]) 
CALIFANO 
v. 
ELI .. I OTT Fed/Civil Timely w/ext. 
1. SUMMARY: The S.G. challenges the determination of the CA7 
..::...::..._::....=----=~- - _,___ 
that the due process clause requires that a Social Security beneficiary 
be given an oral hearing before payments are reduced in order to 
'----------~~----~ 
recoup an erroneous overpayment. 
2. FACTS: Section 204(a) (1) of the Social Security Act 
provides that in the event of an erroneous overpayment, "proper 
adjustment or recovery shall be made, under regulations promulgated 
by the Secretary." Section 204(b) provides that no adjustment shall 
( 
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be made with regard to any beneficiary who is without fault for 
the overpayment or if recovery would d~fe~t the purposes of the Act 
or would be against equity or good conscience. Under the procedures 
established by the Sec, if an overpayment is found, the recipient 
is notified and given an opportunity to contest the determination 
in writing and also to request that recovery be waived under §204(b). 
The recipient can discuss his case with the local Social Security 
Office and adjustment or recovery is deferred pending review of the 
initial determination with one minor exception not relevant here. 
After this preliminary review, if the Sec. remains convinced that 
an overpayment did take place, then the beneficiary's monthly payments 
are adjusted to allow for recovery. The recipient still has open 
the option of requesting further administrative review including 
a full evidentiary hearing. A favorable determination at this stage 
will result in a return of the recovered payments -- but recovery 
proceeds apace during administrative review. 
Several suits challenging .this procedure were filed in DCs 
in Washington and Hawaii and were consolidated by the CA9. That 
court held in its first consideration of the issue, that the 
procedures followed by the Sec. violated the due process clause and 
that beneficiaries were entitled to an oral hearing prior to reduc~ion 
~ 
of benefits at least in those cases where the Sec's determination 
might turn on questions of credibility. (The DC's had concluded 
that they had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1361 
(mandamus) and that certification of the class as a nationwide class 
was appropriate. TheCA also agreed with this analysis.) After 
( \~ theCA's decision, this Court decided Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 
U.S. 319 -- holding that the due process clause does not require 
I 
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a hearing prior to the termination of disability benefits. The 
S.G. then filed a petn for cert in the instant cases, No. 75-1234, 
and this Court granted the petn, and vacated the judgment for further 
consideration in light of Eldridge. (Mathews v. Mattern, No. 75-649, 
was also GUR'ed in light of Eldridge. CA3 then remanded the case 
to the DC which granted summary judgment for the secretary. The 
case is now pending tn appeal in CA 3). 
On remand, the CA essentially adhered to its original 
position, with slight modifications. After first concluding that 
jurisdiction under the mandamus statute was appropriate and that 
class action certification was proper even in the absence of notice 
to all members of the nationwide class, the CA turned to the 
question of how Eldridge affected its earlier decision. The CA 
had no trouble with the preliminary question that recipients' 
interest in their monthly benefits amounted to a property interest 
protectible under the Due Process Clause. The next question was 
(3V what process was due in the event of a recoupment. The CA applied 
Eldridge's three prong test-- consideration of the private interest 
affected, the risk of an erroneous determination, and the governments 
interest in avoiding unnecessary procedural burdens. Looking first 
at the private interest involved, the CA concluded that standing 
alone it was not sufficient to require an oral pre-recoupment 
hearing. Unlike the situation in Goldberg v. Kelly, the receipt 
of Social Security benefits is not a last resort for the beneficiaries 
and is only partially need-based. Further, recoupment does not 
result in elimination of benefits, but only a partial, temporary 
reduction. 
- .. -
Turning next to the risk of an erroneous determination, the 
CA held that in reconsideration case::> -~ where the question is 
simply whether an overpayment occurred -- written submissions are 
most likely sufficient to reach an accurate determination. Thus, 
unless a question of credibility is involved, oral hearings in such 
circumstances probably are not necessary. In the waiver situation, 
. that is, where the Sec is being asked to forego recoupment for 
~v1· • 'reasons of no :fault or equity, theCA concluded that questions of 
credibility are invariably involved and thus written submissions 
would not be sufficient. With regard to the government's interest, 
the CA felt that the requirement of a pre-recoupment hearing in 
certain circumstances would not materially increase the number of 
frivilous claims -- and further, unlike the situation in Eldridge, 
here the recipients are entitled to some benefits and the burden of 
continuing them pending final administrative determination did not 
seem to the CA to impose a great risk of loss or forfeiture on 
the government. 
Finally, the CA addressed the question of the proper ingredients 
of the pre-recoupment hearing. It determined that the hearing need 
not take the form of a quasi-judicial trial -- instead the beneficiary 
should be entitled to present his case orally with evidence and 
witnesses, to cross examine, to be represented by counsel, to have 
an impartial hearing officer, t~eceive a written decision and 
finally to receive adequate notice. Such notice should include a 
statement of the alleged overpayment and the reason therefor, 
recipient's right to request reconsideration or waiver or both, 
a statement of the time limits on the exercise of the rights, notice 
of the right to a recoupment hearing, indication that recoupment will 
- 5 -
( take place unless reconsideration or waiver is requested, indication 
' ' 
that the Administrator will send the appropriate forms upon request, 
and finally a statement of any other relief available. 
3. CONTENTIONS: The S.G.'s primary argument is that the 
existing procedures are more than adequate to comply with the 
requirements of due process and that the procedures imposed by 
the CA are thus unnecessary and burdensome. First, he argues 
that the private interest in the un{terrupted receipt of benefits 
pending final administrative review is less substantial than in 
Eldridge which involved the termination of all disability benefits. 
Further under existing regulations, recipients can request extensions 
of the recoupment period to diminish the amount by which monthly 
payments are reduced. Rarely, if ever, are monthly payments totally 
t. terminated to affect recoupment -- and even in such limited cases, 
recipients are likely eligible for Supplemental Security Income. 
With regard to the risk of error under the present procedures, the 
S.G. argues that the recoupment hearing prior to reduction of 
benefits would lead to a different result (favoring the recipient) 
in less than 1% of the cases -- thus indicating that the problem 
of erroneous determinations is not a substantial one, and compares 
favorably with that in Eldridge. Finally, true to form, the S.G. 
argues that the new procedures would impose a significant burden 
on the government, both in terms of the cost and in terms of delay. 
The S.G. also appears to disagree with the CA that jurisdiction 
was available under the Mandamus statute -- but agrees that under 
§205(g) of the Social Security Act jurisdiction would exist since 
the named respondents all filed claims with the . Sec and further 
exhaustion is not required when a colorable constitutional claim 
- 6 -
is raised. However, the S.G. claims that the CA was not entitled 
to award relief to other than the named respondents for three 
reasons: (a) it is improper to grant relief to persons not before 
the Court (this question is apparently presented in Califano v. 
Aznavorian, No. 77-991, prob. juris noted), each member of the class 
has not satisified the jurisdictional requirements of §205(g), and 
(c) that certification of a nationwide class is improper -- primarily 
because it precludes any other court from addressing the issue 
{this question was apparently raised but not decided in Califano v. 
Mandley, No. 76-1416). Thus, the S.G. urges the Court to take this 
case to resolve the multiple issues presented. 
4. DISCUSSION: I think the S.G.'s arguments are substantial 
and that this case is a possible grant. A response should be 
requested before a final determination is made. 
There is no response. 
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for leave to proceed iJ.E.. 
January 19, 1979 Conference 
List 3, Sheet 2 
No. 77-1511 
CALIFANO (Sec. HEW) 
v. 
ELLIOTT 
Motion of Respondents 
to Dismiss or Remand 
~ ---
SUMMARY: Resps request the Court to dismiss this case or remand 
it to the DC because new information presented by the Sec. in his 
opening brief has so drastically changed the nature of this case that 
the Sec. is abandoning review by this Court of the current procedures 
which were scrutinized by all the lower courts. 
FACTS: CA 7 (Browning, Trask, Williams) held that due process 
requires a Social Security beneficiary be given an oral hearing before 
payments are reduced in order to recoup an erroneous overpayment. 
+~-
CONTENTIONS: All the courts below considered the Sec. 's~current 
procedures for dealing with recoupment of overpayments. However, resps 
claim that the new procedures relied on in the Sec.'s opening brief 





affect the case. In addition, new facts and statistics appear in 
the SG's brief that were never presented 'below. Resps need to probe 
these facts and that has to be done in the courts below. 
DISCUSSION: This case will probably appear on the March calendar. 
Resps' claims are probably overstated, and this Court could presumably 
hear the case and decide it, dealing with resps' contentions at oral 
(
argument. However, out of an abundance of caution, the Court might wish 
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Motion of Resps for Leave to 
Substitute Nancy Yamasaki in 
Place of Evelyn Elliott, Deceased, 
as a Party Respondent 
Resps' counsel move under Rule 48 for an order substituting resp 
Yamasaki as the named respondent, because resp Elliott died in 1973. 
Resp Yamasaki is a proper substitute because she is one of the 
original named plaintiffs in this class action (App. 40). 
DISCUSSION: I am advised that the usual practice is to defer to 
the author of the opinion. Resp Elliott died about six years ago. 
Rule 48 (which does not appear to have contemplated this sort of case) 
requires substitution within six months of the death of the party. 
However, the motion could presumably be granted either under Rule 48 
(in spite of the violation) or under Rule 35 (which deals with motions). 




Alternatively, because a change in name at this time would cause 
confusion, the Court might wish to have its opinion retain the name 
under which the case was briefed and argued. This alternative would 
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Brennan, J ........................... . 
Stewart, J ........................... . 
White, J ............................ . 
Marshall, J .......................... . 
Blackmun, J ......................... . 
Powell, J ........................... . 
Rehnquist, J ........... . 
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Dear Harry: 
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THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
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Jfulrhtghtn. ~. <!]. 2Ilfi'l-~ . 
June 12, 1979 
Dear Harry: 
Re: 77-1511 Califano v. Yamasaki 
I join. 
Mr. Justice Blackrnun 
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CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
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June 12, 1979 
Re: No. 77-1511, Califano v. Yamasaki 
Dear Harry, 
I am glad to join your opinion for the Court. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
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CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
.:§ttpt"tnu <!Jcttd of tlrt ~tb .:§f:atts 
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June 12, 1979 
Re; No. 77-1511 ~ Califano v. Yamasaki 
Dear Harry; 
:Please join me. 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 





JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
.hprttttt arttttrl ttf Urt ~nitth ,.~fattg 
._asfti:ttgtO"tt. ~. ar. 2llgi'!!.;t 
June 12, 1979 
Re: No. 77-1511 Califano v. Yamasaki 
Dear Lewis: 
I have slipped a stitch in failing to note at the 
end of my opinion that you took no part in the consid-
eration or decision of this case. Such a note will be 
appended in the final draft. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
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